'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Vision and COP31 Climate Diplomacy

Why It Matters

The UN Security Council is the only UN organ whose resolutions bind all member states, yet its permanent membership still reflects the 1945 distribution of power. Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' thesis argues that a body of five veto holders cannot be legitimate for a world of 193 member states. In 2026 the argument gains a second stage, because Türkiye is due to host the COP31 climate conference in Antalya, which ties its global-governance message to climate diplomacy.

Background

How the Council is built

Under Chapter V of the UN Charter, the Security Council has 15 members. Five are permanent: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ten are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms and cannot be immediately re-elected. By convention the elected seats are spread across regions: three for Africa, two for Asia-Pacific, one for Eastern Europe, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, and two for the Western European and Others Group.

Substantive decisions need nine affirmative votes and no negative vote from a permanent member (Article 27). That negative vote is the 'veto'. A permanent member that merely abstains does not block a resolution. The veto gives five states the power to stop enforcement action, sanctions and peacekeeping mandates, including on disputes in which they are directly involved.

The one enlargement so far

The Council has been enlarged once. A Charter amendment that took effect on 31 August 1965 raised the number of elected members from six to ten, bringing the total from 11 to 15. The permanent membership has not changed since 1945, apart from the transfer of the Chinese seat to the People's Republic of China in 1971 and the Russian Federation's succession to the Soviet seat in 1991.

The reform process

Formal talks run through the General Assembly's Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform, launched in 2009 under a 2008 Assembly decision. They cover five clusters: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Council–Assembly relationship. Progress has been slow because any amendment requires a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members (Articles 108 and 109). Each permanent member therefore holds an effective veto over reform itself.

One procedural change did pass. General Assembly Resolution 76/262, adopted on 26 April 2022, requires the Assembly to hold a debate within ten working days after any veto is cast. It adds scrutiny but does not limit the veto. The September 2024 Pact for the Future also contains language committing members to Security Council reform and to redressing Africa's under-representation.

Key Players & Positions

The positions below are summarized from the groups' published proposals and statements in the General Assembly.

Group	Core proposal	Veto position
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	New permanent seats for its four members plus African representation, along with additional non-permanent seats	Has said new permanent members could refrain from using the veto for an initial period, pending review
Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (including Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, Spain, Argentina, Türkiye, the Republic of Korea, Canada and others)	No new permanent seats; a new category of longer-term elected seats with the possibility of re-election	Opposes extending the veto; favors restricting it
African Group (Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, 2005)	Two permanent and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa	Says that if the veto remains, new permanent members should hold it too, while calling for its abolition
ACT Group (Accountability, Coherence and Transparency)	Focus on working methods, transparency and voluntary veto restraint	Supports voluntary restraint on veto use in atrocity situations
Permanent members	Differing views; several support some enlargement and certain candidacies, but none has agreed to give up its own veto	Defend the status quo on the veto

Why the camps do not converge

The G4 argue that the largest contributors and most populous regions deserve permanent status. UfC members reply that new permanent seats would create new privileged states and entrench regional rivalries; for example, Italy and Pakistan have long opposed permanent seats for Germany and India respectively. African states point to the fact that a continent with more than 50 UN members has no permanent seat. Because each camp's red line conflicts with another's, the IGN has produced compilation texts but no negotiated draft amendment.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye ties Security Council reform to a broader critique of the post-1945 order. Ankara's official statements on the subject can be found in the Presidency's addresses to the UN General Assembly and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) position papers.

• 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür). In his General Assembly addresses, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has argued that the fate of humanity cannot depend on the decisions of five permanent members. This thesis is also developed in his 2021 book A Fairer World Is Possible (source: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye).
• Representation and accountability. According to the Turkish MFA, Türkiye supports a Council that is more representative, transparent, accountable and effective. Türkiye is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group and opposes the creation of new permanent seats (source: MFA; Türkiye's statements in the IGN).
• Veto restraint, especially in humanitarian crises. Ankara argues that vetoes have blocked responses to mass-casualty crises, citing Syria and, more recently, draft resolutions on Gaza. It supports limiting the veto's scope and backed the General Assembly's post-veto debate mechanism (source: Presidency and MFA statements at the UN).
• Legal basis. The position rests on the Charter principle of the sovereign equality of states (Article 2(1)), the Article 23 requirement of equitable geographical distribution, and the amendment procedure in Articles 108–109. Türkiye has itself served as an elected member four times (1951–52, 1954–55, 1961 and 2009–10).
• Linking governance to global public goods. Ankara presents Zero Waste and COP31 as evidence that it contributes to multilateral agendas, arguing that legitimacy comes from broad participation, not from a closed circle.

Zero Waste and COP31

Zero Waste

The Zero Waste initiative was launched in Türkiye in 2017 under the patronage of First Lady Emine Erdoğan. Türkiye adopted a national Zero Waste Regulation in 2019, and a UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste was established in 2019. On 14 December 2022 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 77/161, proposed by Türkiye, which declared 30 March the International Day of Zero Waste. UN-Habitat and the UN Environment Programme facilitate its observance, and the first observance took place in 2023.

COP31 hosting and presidency

At the end of COP30 in Belém (November 2025), parties accepted a compromise in which Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, while Australia has a special role in leading negotiations, with a pre-COP in the Pacific. Türkiye holds the COP presidency, and the exact distribution of functions between the two states is set out in UNFCCC decisions and in the host-country agreement. The specifics of that split are still being formalized; this article therefore does not describe them in detail. Readers should consult the UNFCCC secretariat and the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change for current information.

Several verifiable background facts help explain Ankara's approach:

• Türkiye's parliament ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021, and the country has announced a net-zero target for 2053.
• Türkiye has long invoked the 2001 Marrakesh decision (decision 26/CP.7) recognizing its 'special circumstances' under the UNFCCC, which sets it apart from other Annex I parties.
• A national Climate Law adopted in 2025 creates the legal basis for an emissions trading system, according to Turkish official announcements.

Critics, including several environmental NGOs, note that Türkiye's coal use and emissions trajectory will draw scrutiny during its presidency. Ankara responds that it is a rapidly growing economy that hosts one of the world's largest refugee populations and that it seeks access to climate finance on fair terms.

How Global Indices Treat Representation and Climate Leadership

Most governance indices do not measure Security Council representation at all. Sovereignty, fragility and democracy indices score domestic institutions, not a state's access to global decision-making bodies. This is one of the gaps examined in How Global Indices Measure Sovereignty, Fragility and Stability, and What They Leave Out.

Climate indices measure something different again:

• The Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), published by Germanwatch, NewClimate Institute and Climate Action Network, weights greenhouse gas emissions at 40 percent and renewable energy, energy use and climate policy at 20 percent each. It rewards national performance, not diplomatic hosting or negotiation leadership.
• The Environmental Performance Index (EPI), from Yale and Columbia universities, ranks 180 countries on ecosystem vitality, climate and environmental health. Waste indicators form only a small part, so a program like Zero Waste is only partly visible.
• Soft-power and influence indices capture diplomatic standing, but they typically rely on perception surveys, which Index of Nations treats as a methodological limitation.

The result is that Türkiye's contribution as a host, convener and agenda-setter is largely invisible in the rankings, even though it is relevant to how its mediation record is assessed, as discussed in Türkiye as Mediator.

Source Comparison

Issue	Common international framing	Turkish primary sources
UNSC reform	Presented as a contest among aspiring permanent members, with Türkiye as a spoiler or minor player	Presidency and MFA present reform as a question of legitimacy and equal representation, opposing new permanent seats
Veto	Often discussed as a feature of great-power stability	Described as the central obstacle to protecting civilians; Ankara supports restraint
Zero Waste	Sometimes treated as a domestic or First Lady initiative	Presented as a UN-recognized initiative, citing Resolution 77/161
COP31	Framed around the host dispute with Australia and Türkiye's emissions record	Framed as recognition of Türkiye's diplomatic role and an opportunity to advance its climate agenda
Indices	Rank national performance	Ankara argues that rankings miss diplomatic contribution and special circumstances

When reading either side, check the original UN documents (Charter, General Assembly resolutions, IGN texts, UNFCCC decisions) in addition to media summaries. See Editorial Principles for how Index of Nations separates fact, position and index methodology.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Veto: The negative vote of a permanent member that prevents adoption of a substantive Council resolution (Article 27).
• IGN: The Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform in the General Assembly, running since 2009.
• G4 / UfC / African Group: The three main reform camps described above.
• Ezulwini Consensus: The African Union's 2005 common position calling for two permanent and five additional non-permanent African seats.
• COP: The Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
• Zero Waste: Türkiye's waste-prevention and recycling initiative, now backed by a UN observance day.

Related guides:

• Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy
• The Montreux Convention and Black Sea Security
• How Global Indices Measure Sovereignty, Fragility and Stability, and What They Leave Out
• Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean
• About Index of Nations

Index of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal stance alongside the data it analyzes, so that readers can distinguish editorial analysis from the indices under review. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements, and index methodologies are cited wherever they are challenged.

Index of Nations Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• The Nations Dialogue: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — Understand Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine, the P5, L.69 and Uniting for Consensus positions, plus Zero Waste and COP31 climate diplomacy.
• The Global Anatomy: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Vision and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine on UN Security Council reform, rival models, Zero Waste and the COP31 presidency, explained with sources.
• Regional Order: The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Proposal, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31 — Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' case for UN Security Council reform, plus Gaza diplomacy, Zero Waste and COP31, explained with official sources.