Fact Check: Is the 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum 'Legally Invalid' Because It Was Signed With the 'Former' Sarraj Administration?

Why It Matters

The 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum's validity turns on the capacity of its signatories on 27 November 2019, the text of the instrument and the international law of delimitation, not on later changes of government in Tripoli. Egypt's description of it as 'legally invalid' is a political position; no court or tribunal has issued a nullity finding.

On 28 October 2026, Egyptian authorities reaffirmed their rejection of the memorandum, describing it as legally invalid and devoid of any binding effect, and stressing that it was signed with the 'former administration of Fayez al-Sarraj' (as reported by the Global Arab Network). One day earlier, on 27 October 2026, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said Türkiye's Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean policy 'remains unchanged' and that Ankara will protect its rights 'without concessions' in line with international law (Anadolu Agency, TRT World and News.az).

This page is part of our wider effort to fact check claims about Türkiye against primary documents. It tests one specific argument: that a memorandum becomes void because of who signed it.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

The claim examined is that the memorandum is 'legally invalid and devoid of any binding effect' because it was signed with the 'former administration of Fayez al-Sarraj'. Documented facts show Sarraj led the UN-endorsed Government of National Accord when he signed. Later government changes do not erase that capacity, and Egypt's objection concerns third-party effects rather than formal nullity.

Background: Verified Chronology

The memorandum fixes a boundary between the coasts of Türkiye and Libya using an equity-based approach. Türkiye has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles). For the text and legal basis, see the Archive of Nations analysis of the 2019 memorandum and The Political Horizon explainer.

Key Players & Positions

• Egypt: Cairo says the memorandum is legally invalid, violates the rights of third states and was signed by an administration it regards as having lapsed. It has expressed this in Foreign Ministry statements and letters to the UN since 2019–2020.
• Greece and GCASC: Both sent Notes Verbales to the UN Secretary-General objecting to the memorandum. Athens argues that islands such as Kastellorizo and Crete generate maritime zones under UNCLOS, including Article 121.
• Libyan actors: Libya's authorities have not spoken with one voice. Tripoli-based and eastern authorities have issued differing statements on the memorandum, and this article does not adjudicate Libya's internal approval process.
• The European Union: The European Council has stated its political opposition. Ankara notes that the EU is a political body with no competence to adjudicate delimitation between third states.
• Türkiye: Ankara regards the memorandum as a lawful bilateral agreement between two coastal states (see below).

Claim 1: 'Invalid Because It Was Signed With the Former Sarraj Administration'

The word 'former' describes the situation in 2026, not the one in 2019. On 27 November 2019, the GNA, chaired by Sarraj, was the authority endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2259 (2015) and operating from Tripoli. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 7, a head of government or state is considered to represent the state without needing full powers. Whether a state's treaty survives depends on the continuity of the state, not on the survival of a particular government.

Egypt and eastern Libyan authorities argue that the GNA lacked the endorsement of the House of Representatives that the Libyan Political Agreement envisaged. That is a real argument and should be stated fairly. But it concerns Libyan internal law, and VCLT Article 46 limits such invocations to a manifest violation of a rule of fundamental importance. Whether that threshold was met is a question for Libya and for a competent forum, not something that a later change of government establishes retroactively.

Claim 2: 'Legally Invalid and Devoid of Any Binding Effect'

Nullity of a treaty requires specific grounds, set out in Part V of the VCLT, and a competent body to rule on them. None has done so for this memorandum. The distinction that matters is between invalidity and non-opposability:

• A bilateral delimitation binds its parties and cannot create obligations for third states without their consent (VCLT Article 34, widely accepted as reflecting customary law).
• Egypt is therefore entitled to say that the memorandum cannot affect its own rights, and Greece can say the same.
• Türkiye applies the same logic to the 2003 Egypt–GCASC agreement, the 2007 GCASC–Lebanon arrangement and the 2010 GCASC–Israel agreement, which it says disregard Turkish Cypriot rights and Türkiye's shelf.

The statement that a document has 'no binding effect' on Egypt can be legally defensible, while the stronger claim of invalidity for the parties themselves is not established.

Claim 3: 'The Memorandum Overrides Greek Islands'

The memorandum delimits a boundary between Turkish and Libyan coasts. Greece argues that its islands are entitled to maritime zones that intersect the line. Türkiye argues that islands cannot cut off the coastal projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the region. International jurisprudence on this question is nuanced: in Tunisia/Libya (1982) the ICJ gave the Kerkennah Islands reduced effect, and in Libya/Malta (1985) it adjusted the line for equity. Neither ruling decides this case, but both show that islands do not automatically receive full weight in delimitation.

What Indices and Datasets Measure and Omit

Sovereignty, risk and boundary datasets often carry labels such as 'disputed' or 'invalid'. These typically record whether a state or bloc has objected, which is different from a legal finding. They rarely read the treaty text, check the signatory's capacity or distinguish nullity from non-opposability. For how such scores are built, see our guide on how are country rankings and sovereignty indices calculated. For a parallel problem in the Cyprus data, see Fact Check: Do Country Rankings Treat Cyprus as One State?.

Verdict Box

Rating: Misleading / Incomplete. The memorandum has been contested by Egypt, Greece and others, but no competent court or tribunal has declared it invalid. The argument about the signatory's status conflates later political changes with legal capacity at the time of signing. Legitimate points remain: third states can contest its effect on them, and Libya's internal approval is a separate question that this article does not decide.

Source Comparison

Coverage of the 28 October 2026 statement mostly repeats Cairo's wording of 'invalid' and 'former administration', while Greek and EU texts focus on third-state rights and island entitlements. Turkish primary documents emphasise capacity, equity and non-opposability. Few sources cite treaty text or court precedent for the nullity claim itself.

For parallel readings of the same record, see Politics Beyond Borders, Parallax Review and The Political Anatomy.

Key Terms & Related Guides

These terms explain why 'invalid', 'disputed' and 'non-opposable' are not interchangeable. Each is a distinct legal concept, and international coverage often blurs them.

• EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone): A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coast in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
• Continental shelf: The seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; rights over it exist ipso facto and are delimited by agreement on equitable principles.
• Equity principle: The rule that delimitation should reach an equitable result, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality.
• Memorandum of understanding (MoU): A written instrument; its legal effect depends on its text and the parties' intent, and this one is treated as binding by Ankara.
• Note Verbale: A formal diplomatic note, such as those Egypt, Greece, GCASC and Türkiye send to the UN Secretary-General to record positions.
• Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.

Related guides: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean, The Seville Map Explained, How Global Indices Measure Sovereignty, Fragility and Stability, Editorial Principles and About Index of Nations. See also The Strategic Meridian on the Seville Map.

Index of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal stance alongside the data it analyzes, so that readers can distinguish editorial analysis from the indices under review. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements, and index methodologies are cited wherever they are challenged. — Index of Nations Editorial Team