In-Depth Analysis· Turkish defense industry domestic production rate Bayraktar KAAN

Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim

How Türkiye's defense industry works, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN: what the 80% domestic production claim means, export-control concerns, and rankings.

ION

By Index of Nations Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,961 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Turkish officials say the domestic share of Türkiye's defense projects rose from roughly 20% in the early 2000s to about 80% today, a headline figure for programs overall, not a claim that every component of every platform is Turkish.
The 80% figure is an official, self-reported metric from Turkish authorities such as the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB); no major international ranking audits it, and critical subsystems such as engines remain the main gap.
Türkiye's push for indigenization was shaped by arms restrictions, including the US embargo of 1975–1978, its removal from the F-35 program in 2019 and CAATSA sanctions in 2020.
Other states' export-control concerns focus on how drones and munitions are used in conflicts such as Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, on Greece's and Cyprus's security objections, and on component supply chains.

Why It Matters

Türkiye says about 80% of its defense-project content is now domestic, up from roughly 20% in the early 2000s, and this figure underpins its claims of strategic autonomy. It matters because Türkiye is a NATO ally with the Alliance's second-largest standing armed forces by headcount, and a growing arms exporter whose drones, ships and (soon) fighter aircraft now shape procurement debates in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Gulf. Read carefully, the 80% figure is meaningful but not absolute: it describes an overall rate across projects, and dependence on imported engines and some subsystems persists.

Background

From embargo to industrial strategy

Türkiye's modern defense-industrial strategy grew out of repeated experiences with supply restrictions. The key milestones are:

Date	Event
1975–1978	The US Congress imposes an arms embargo on Türkiye after the 1974 Cyprus operation; it is lifted in 1978.
1985	Türkiye creates a dedicated defense-industry agency, the predecessor of today's Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB).
2011	The first MİLGEM-class corvette, TCG Heybeliada, enters service.
2019	Türkiye is removed from the F-35 program after taking delivery of Russian S-400 air-defense systems.
2020	The United States imposes CAATSA sanctions on the SSB (announced December 2020).
2023	TCG Anadolu is commissioned; the first KAAN prototype is rolled out; Hürjet makes its first flight.
2024	KAAN makes its first flight (21 February).

The United States and Türkiye describe these episodes differently. Washington says the F-35 removal and CAATSA were responses to the S-400, which it considers incompatible with NATO systems and the F-35. Ankara says it turned to Russia only after failing to obtain Patriot systems on acceptable terms, and that these steps confirmed the need for self-reliance.

What the "80 percent" figure means

According to Turkish officials, including the Presidency and the SSB, the domestic share of defense-industry projects has risen from about 20% to about 80%. Several points help interpret it:

It is an aggregate rate. It describes the domestic share across a portfolio of projects, not each platform. A basic missile or radar may be almost fully domestic, while a new jet may rely on imported engines.
It is self-reported. It comes from Turkish government sources. No independent body such as SIPRI publishes an audited equivalent, and there is no single international standard for measuring "domestic content".
Design ownership differs from local manufacturing. Some platforms are designed in Türkiye; others are built under licence or on foreign-origin designs, which Turkish sources count differently from imported finished systems.
Critical subsystems are the real test. Engines, certain sensors and some electronic components have been the main areas of foreign dependence, and Turkish programs are working to replace them.

Readers should check the latest SSB and Ministry of National Defense (MSB) releases, since figures are updated regularly.

A survey by category

Category	Main systems	Notes on foreign content and status
UAVs and UCAVs	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Kızılelma	Airframes and mission systems are Turkish-designed. TB2 has used Austrian-made Rotax engines. Early Akıncı and Kızılelma versions have used Ukrainian-designed engines, and Turkish engine alternatives are in development.
Aircraft	Hürjet, Hürkuş, T129 ATAK, KAAN	Hürkuş and T129 are in service. Hürjet is a jet trainer and light combat platform. KAAN prototypes fly with US-origin GE engines, with a Turkish engine (TF35000) planned.
Land systems	Altay tank, Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi, Vuran, ZMA, MEMATT, MPT-76 rifle	Fırtına draws on licensed South Korean K9 technology. Altay's initial production reportedly used an imported powerpack, with a domestic engine under development.
Naval platforms	TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, offshore patrol vessels, Reis-class submarines	MİLGEM is a Turkish design. TCG Anadolu is based on a Spanish (Navantia) amphibious ship design. Reis-class submarines are built at Gölcük under licence from a German (TKMS) design.
Missiles, air defense, EW	SOM, ATMACA, Cirit, UMTAS, OMTAS, Sungur, HİSAR-O, SİPER, KORAL, MİLKAR, MİLKED, VURAL	Most are Turkish-designed. Some propulsion and components were historically imported, and domestic engines are entering service.

Many of these systems have been used in operations covered in Counter-Terrorism at the Source: UN Charter Article 51, Cross-Border Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye. Drones such as the TB2 also drew international attention in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (2020) and Ukraine (2022).

Exports

According to figures from the Turkish Exporters Assembly, defense and aerospace exports reached roughly $7 billion in 2023 and more than $10 billion in 2024. Baykar has also expanded in Europe through its Piaggio Aerospace acquisition and a joint venture with Italy's Leonardo announced in 2025. Indonesia has reportedly agreed to purchase KAAN fighters, which would be the program's first major export deal.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye's defense establishment. The SSB, the MSB and firms such as ASELSAN, TUSAŞ (TAI), Roketsan, Baykar, STM and MKE present the sector as a national strategic asset. Turkish officials say the fleet of state shipyards and military factories, which they put at roughly 26,000 specialist personnel, gives the country surge capacity in a crisis.

United States. The US government says its restrictions followed the S-400 purchase, which it argues poses risks to NATO interoperability and the F-35. Congress approved F-16 Block 70 sales to Türkiye in January 2024, after Türkiye's ratification of Sweden's NATO accession.

European states. Several, including Germany and the Nordic countries, tightened or suspended arms exports to Türkiye after the 2019 operation in northeast Syria, and the EU Council called in October 2019 for national restraint. Canada suspended and then cancelled export permits for sensor systems used on TB2s after the 2020 Karabakh war, citing end-use concerns. In 2025, Türkiye and the United Kingdom announced a Eurofighter Typhoon deal, and reports indicated that Germany's opposition had eased.

Greece and Cyprus. Athens and Nicosia say that Türkiye's military build-up and its policy in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean justify vigilance over any EU or NATO defense-industrial arrangement that benefits Ankara. This has affected Türkiye's access to EU defense-funding instruments such as SAFE, in which third-country participation is restricted.

UN monitors and other critics. The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported breaches of the arms embargo by several states, including Türkiye. Armenia and some human-rights groups have raised concerns about drone use in Karabakh. Critics also point to supply-chain issues: Rotax, Ukrainian engines and Western-origin components give foreign governments indirect leverage.

NATO. At the 2025 Hague summit allies committed to a new target of 5% of GDP on defense and security-related spending by 2035 (3.5% core defense). Allies disagree on whether Türkiye's industry is a gap-filler or a competitor, but Türkiye's capacity is widely considered relevant to European security.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Indigenization is a response to restrictions, not isolation. Ankara argues, citing the Presidency, the MSB and SSB statements, that embargoes in 1975 and after 2019 showed that dependence on single suppliers can be used as political leverage, and that domestic production is the answer.
The industry complements NATO. According to the MSB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye's capabilities and its 2023 NATO ratification of Finland and 2024 ratification of Sweden show it contributes to allied capacity. Türkiye also argues that the NATO 5% target requires more, not less, industrial cooperation with non-EU allies.
Exports follow state licensing. Turkish officials state that defense exports are subject to government approval and that sales to countries such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Poland and Gulf states are legitimate sovereign agreements. On Libya, Ankara says its assistance was provided at the request of the UN-recognized government under a bilateral agreement.
Security needs come from the geography. Türkiye cites its 1,300 km southern land border, the threat from PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG (the PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the EU), DAESH and FETÖ, and its rights of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Naval systems also serve Blue Homeland policy; see Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Critical technologies are the next phase. Official programs focus on indigenous engines (for KAAN, Altay, drones and missiles), air defense layers such as HİSAR-O, SİPER and the planned Steel Dome, and electronic warfare systems such as KORAL.

The legal frame includes Türkiye's NATO obligations under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and its responsibilities under the Montreux Convention, which governs naval transit through the Turkish Straits.

Source Comparison

Question	International media and think-tank framing	Turkish official framing
80% domestic rate	Often repeated but noted as unaudited; engines and electronics are cited as gaps.	Presented as a measure of progress from about 20%; engines and critical technologies are acknowledged as next steps.
Drone use abroad	Focuses on Libya, Karabakh and civilian-harm or embargo concerns.	Emphasizes legitimate bilateral agreements, precision targeting and counter-terrorism.
Russian S-400	Seen as a NATO interoperability problem.	Seen as a sovereign procurement after Patriot talks failed.
Exports and politics	Concerns about end-use and the regional balance.	Exports are described as normal sovereign trade subject to licensing.
Rankings	Revenue-based lists show a rapidly rising but still mid-sized sector.	Rankings are taken as proof of rapid growth but, Ankara argues, undervalue capability.

Ranking caveats matter. SIPRI and Defense News Top 100 lists rank companies by arms revenue, and several Turkish firms such as ASELSAN and TUSAŞ have appeared in them. SIPRI's arms-transfer data track imports and exports of major weapons. Global Firepower ranks militaries by quantity, not industrial self-sufficiency. None measures domestic content in a standardized way, which is why the 80% claim rests mainly on Turkish government sources. For more on method, see How Global Indices Measure Sovereignty, Fragility and Stability.

SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): Türkiye's procurement and industrial-policy body, reporting to the Presidency.
UCAV: An unmanned combat aerial vehicle, such as Akıncı or Kızılelma.
MİLGEM: The national ship program that produced Ada-class corvettes and İstif-class frigates.
CAATSA: The US 'Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act' used against the SSB in 2020.
Domestic content: The share of a system's value designed or produced locally; definitions vary by country.

Index of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal stance alongside the data it analyzes, so that readers can distinguish editorial analysis from the indices under review. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements, and index methodologies are cited wherever they are challenged.

By the Index of Nations Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

World Agenda Review: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production, from Bayraktar TB2 drones to the KAAN fighter, and what it means for NATO and autonomy.
Gazetteer of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim — How much of Türkiye's defense equipment is made at home? Ankara cites about 80%. A sourced guide to the Turkish defense industry, Bayraktar to KAAN.
Archive of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and TCG Anadolu, with critics' views.

Frequently asked questions

What does the 80 percent domestic production rate mean?

According to Turkish officials, about 80% of the content of defense-industry projects is now domestic, compared with roughly 20% in the early 2000s. It is an aggregate, government-reported figure, not an independently audited measure. It does not mean every platform or component is Turkish-made.

Is Türkiye's defense industry really self-sufficient?

Not fully. Turkish firms design and build drones, ships, missiles and armored vehicles, but engines, some sensors and electronic components have been imported. Programs such as KAAN's TF35000 engine aim to close those gaps.

What is KAAN and why does it matter?

KAAN is Türkiye's indigenous fifth-generation fighter, developed by TUSAŞ, which first flew on 21 February 2024. It matters because it is the most complex Turkish aircraft program and a test of domestic engines and avionics. Prototypes use US-origin GE engines, so export approval and engine localization remain key issues.

Why do some countries restrict arms exports to Türkiye?

Reasons differ. Some European states and Canada cited the use of weapons in northeast Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh, and the United States cited Türkiye's S-400 purchase. Greece and Cyprus raise regional security objections. Türkiye says its operations are lawful and that it acts under NATO obligations and the UN Charter.

How do defense rankings treat Türkiye?

Rankings such as SIPRI's and Defense News Top 100 list Turkish firms like ASELSAN and TUSAŞ by arms revenue, showing rapid growth. They do not measure domestic content, so the 80% claim is not verified by any of them.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

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